The Populist Dynamic: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Fighting Populism

25.03.2024 14:15 – 15:30

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS SEMINAR

(jointly with: Massimo Morelli, Tommaso Nannicini, Piero Stanig)

Abstract:

We evaluate how traditional parties may respond to populist parties on issues aligning with populist messages. During the 2020 Italian referendum on the reduction of members of Parliament, we conducted a large-scale field experiment, exposing small municipalities to nearly a million impressions of programmatic advertising. Our treatments comprised two video ads against the reform: one debunking populist rhetoric and another attributing blame to populist politicians. The anti-populist campaign proved effective through demobilization, as it reduced turnout and the votes in favor of the reform. Notably, these effects were more pronounced in municipalities with lower rates of college graduates, higher unemployment, and a history of populist votes. This exogenous impact persisted, resulting in a distinct populist dynamic. In the 2022 National election, municipalities exposed to the experimental campaign exhibited increased support for Brothers of Italy, a populist party on the rise, alongside decreased support for both traditional parties and the populists involved in the 2020 reform. A subsequent survey shows heightened political interest and decreased trust in institutions in treated municipalities.

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